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THOMAS F. GILLESPIE III*
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: A Missed
Opportunity to Right the Wrongs in the PSLRA
and Rebalance the Private Rule 10b-5 Litigation
Playing Field
IN DuRA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V BROUDO' THE U.S. SUPREME COURT considered
whether the Ninth Circuit's "inflated purchase price" approach to proving loss cau-
sation was consistent with the applicable federal securities laws, specifically the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 19952 (PSLRA). The Court held that it was
not, explaining that plaintiffs must prove that they have suffered an actual eco-
nomic loss in order to satisfy the loss causation requirement of a Rule 10b-5 securi-
ties fraud claim.3 The Court also found that the plaintiffs' complaint was
insufficient as a matter of law because it made no mention of any financial injury
other than alleging that the plaintiffs paid artificially inflated purchase prices.4 In
reaching this decision, the Court chose not to provide affirmative guidance with
respect to which pleading standard applies to plaintiffs' loss causation pleadings.5
Nonetheless, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case with
instructions to dismiss.6
Though Dura is good law, it falls far short of being the landmark decision for
which many commentators had hoped.7 In Dura, the Court faced several important
issues: (1) whether loss causation is a separate and distinct element of a Rule 10b-5
securities fraud claim; (2) if so, what factual predicates constitute a showing
thereof; and (3) what pleading standard applies to it? The Court only chose to
J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 2006. The author is the Technology Transfer Associate for
the J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI), a mid-sized non-profit independent genomics and proteomics laboratory.
1. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 336.
4. Id. at 337.
5. See id. (stating that the Court need not reach the issue of whether or not the higher standard described
in the PSLRA applies to a plaintiffs' loss causation pleadings because the plaintiffs in the case at bar could not
even satisfy a notice pleading standard); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
6. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 337.
7. See Ann Morales Olazabal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 337, 341 (2006) (observing that many commentators expected affirmative guidance as to
what must be pled and proven in order to properly show economic loss and/or loss causation when the Court
granted certiorari).
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affirmatively answer the first question. In so doing, it took a positive step toward
effectuating the congressional intent that undergirds the PSLRA, which was to
make it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring frivolous securities fraud lawsuits.' In
choosing not to offer affirmative guidance with respect to the latter two questions,
however, the Court effectively ignored the most important issues presented in
Dura.
Affirmative answers regarding how economic loss can be pled, and the extent to
which it must be pled in order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, would have
profoundly impacted how securities fraud cases are litigated. This Note argues that
the Court should have expressly stated: (1) that it was adopting the out-of-pocket
measure of damages for fraud-on-the market securities fraud cases; (2) that loss
causation must be pled with particularity and that the preferred way to plead loss
causation is to demonstrate that there was a drop in the price of the defendant's
stock that can be contemporaneously linked to a corrective disclosure; and (3) that
if plaintiffs cannot demonstrate loss causation via allegations of a corrective disclo-
sure price drop, they must allege facts in their complaint that evince the existence
of a significant nexus between the defendant's misrepresentation and their alleged
economic injury. Such a holding would have been consistent with the congressional
intent undergirding the passage of the PSLRA, and would have struck the appropri-
ate balance between disallowing strike suits and facilitating the flow of legitimate
cases to trial.
I. THE CASE
Michael Broudo, along with other members of the class, purchased shares of Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. common stock between April 15, 1997 and February 24,
1998.' During that period, Dura issued several press releases indicating that its
Albuterol Spiros Device, an asthma medication delivery product, had been ade-
quately tested and was almost ready to go to market.'" Dura allegedly made these
statements despite knowledge to the contrary." During the class period, Dura's
stock price increased, reaching a high of $53 per share. 2 On the last day of the class
period, Dura issued another release stating that it expected lower-than-forecasted
revenues and earnings for 1998 because of slower-than-expected sales of another
product, Ceclor CD. 13 Dura's stock price dropped 47 percent on the day of this
8. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 740 (stating
that Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that allegations of fraud be pleaded with
"particularity," has not deterred "professional" securities fraud plaintiffs and their counsel from filing meritless
lawsuits, and that there is still a "need to establish uniform and more stringent pleading requirements to curtail
the filing of meritless lawsuits" (emphasis added)).
9. Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
10. Id.
II. Id.
12. Id. at 936.
13. Id.
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announcement and for the remainder of the year, its business declined. 4 Dura later
announced that its Albuterol Spiros Device would not go to market because the
Food and Drug Administration refused to authorize it. 5 This announcement came
after the class period closed.'6
Michael Broudo filed several class action suits on behalf of himself and other
similarly situated investors, claiming that Dura's conduct during the class period
violated section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,"7 section 20(a) of




17. Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is titled, "Manipulative and deceptive de-
vices," and states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap
agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
18. Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is titled, "Liability of Controlling Persons and
Persons Who Aid and Abet Violations." It states that:
(a) Joint and several liability; good faith defense. Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls
any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall
also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith
and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
(b) Unlawful activity through or by means of any other person. It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under
the provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder through or by means of any other
person.
(c) Hindering, delaying, or obstructing the making or filing of any document, report, or information.
It shall be unlawful for any director or officer of, or any owner of any securities issued by, any issuer
required to file any document, report, or information under this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder without just cause to hinder, delay, or obstruct the making or filing of any such docu-
ment, report, or information.
(d) Liability for trading in securities while in possession of material nonpublic information. Wher-
ever communicating, or purchasing or selling a security while in possession of, material nonpublic
information would violate, or result in liability to any purchaser or seller of the security under any
provisions of this chapter, or any rule or regulation thereunder, such conduct in connection with a
purchase or sale of a put, call, straddle, option, privilege or security-based swap agreement (as de-
fined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) with respect to such security or with respect to
a group or index of securities including such security, shall also violate and result in comparable
liability to any purchaser or seller of that security under such provision, rule, or regulation.
15 U.S.C. § 78t.
19. SEC Rule lOb-5 is titled, "Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices." It states that:
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trial court consolidated these actions into a single class action suit.2" After pre-trial
discovery, Dura filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.2 ' Dura argued that the case
should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to properly plead that they suffered
economic losses as a result of Dura's misrepresentation, i.e.-that the plaintiffs
failed to adequately plead loss causation.22 The district court granted Dura's mo-
tion, reasoning that the plaintiffs failed to plead loss causation because the an-
nouncement on the last day of the class period, which coincided with the dip in
Dura's stock price, did not mention Dura's Albuterol Spiros device.23 The plaintiffs
appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.2 4 The Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs adequately pled loss causation by alleg-
ing that they purchased artificially overpriced securities. 25 The defendants peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Causation in a Rule lOb-5 Claim
In Binder v. Gillespie, the Ninth Circuit listed the six elements that must be pled
and proven in order to prevail in a private Rule 10b-5 securities fraud claim.27
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.iob-5 (2007).
20. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 937.
21. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may submit a motion for immedi-
ate dismissal if the plaintiffs complaint fails to plead an affirmative cause of action or sufficient facts under
which relief can be granted.
22. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 937. Note that in the original complaint, the plaintiffs also asserted that Dura's
representations during the class period about Ceclor CD, an antibiotic, also violated the aforementioned secur-
ities laws. Id. However, the trial court dismissed this claim as well because the plaintiffs failed to plead facts that
indicated that Dura acted with scienter in making misstatements about Ceclor CD. Id. This issue was pursued
on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which vacated the trial court's findings because the district court had examined
each individual allegation in isolation rather than focusing on the totality of the facts alleged. See id. at 940.
Interestingly, this issue was not pursued in the second appeal, and thus was not before the Supreme Court in
Dura.
23. Id. Note that loss causation has long been thought to be a separate and distinct element of a Rule 1Ob-
5 claim, though the Supreme Court until Dura had not endorsed a bifurcated transaction causation-loss causa-
tion analysis for 10b-5 claims. See Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J.
CORP. L. 829, 832 (2006).
24. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 937.
25. Id. at 941.
26. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005).
27. 184 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom., Binder v. Wilson, 528 U.S. 1154 (2000). The
author would like to conspicuously note that there is no relation between the Thomas Gillespie from Binder v.
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Specifically, the court explained that "[a] successful securities fraud action requires
proof of a (1) misrepresentation or omission (2) of material fact (3) made with
scienter (4) on which the plaintiff justifiably relied (5) that proximately cause[d]
the alleged loss."2" Courts have tended to sub-divide the sixth "causation" element
into two pieces, transaction causation and loss causation, since the Second Circuit
did so in Schlick v. Penn Dixie Cement Corp.29 in 1974."0 Generally speaking, trans-
action causation refers to facts that prove that the plaintiff relied upon the validity
of representations made by the defendant when entering into the securities
purchase transaction at issue." It is somewhat akin to proof of reliance.32 Loss cau-
sation refers to facts that prove that the plaintiff actually suffered a financial loss as
a result of her reliance upon the misrepresentations made by the defendant.33 It is
more akin to proof of proximate cause.3 4 Circuits have been split as to what factual
predicates constitute a showing of loss causation, i.e.-when is a shareholder plain-
tiff's financial injury sufficiently definite such that is a redressible injury in a 10b-5
case.
Prior to Dura, the Ninth Circuit applied the minority view of loss causation. In
Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, the Ninth Circuit explained that, "[i]n a fraud-on-the-
market case, plaintiffs establish loss causation if they have shown that the price on
Gillespie and the author. Thomas J. Gillespie formed Aqua Vie Beverage Corporation (AVBC) in 1991 by
purchasing a publicly owned shell corporation and merging it with his Hawaii-based beverage company, KWC,
Inc. See id. at 1062. He later moved this organization to Sun Valley, Idaho, and began producing "lightly
flavored," noncarbonated spring water. Id. (quotations omitted). AVBC stock soon began trading publicly on
the over-the-counter (OTC) market. Id. In 1994, Albert Binder sued AVBC and Thomas J. Gillespie personally
alleging that Mr. Gillespie, while acting in his capacity as CEO of AVBC, violated section 10(b) of the '34 Act
and Rule 10b-5. See id. The author, Thomas F. Gillespie III is the Technology Transfer Associate for the J. Craig
Venter Institute (JCVI) and is completely unrelated to the Dura litigation.
28. Id.
29. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974).
30. See Binder, 184 F.3d at 1065 (observing that "[t]he causation requirement in Rule lOb-5 securities
fraud cases includes 'both transaction causation, that the violations in question caused the plaintiff to engage in
the transaction, and loss causation, that the misrepresentations or omissions caused the harm"' (quoting
McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 1992))).
31. Id. Please note that in traditional deceit and misrepresentation actions, which are the common law
ancestors of Rule 10b-5, there was privity between the defendant and the plaintiff often due to face-to-face
dealings, wherein the alleged misrepresentation or deceitful statement was made. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at
344.
32. See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that "[t]ransaction causa-
tion is akin to reliance, and requires only an allegation that 'but for the claimed misrepresentations or omis-
sions, the plaintiff would not have entered into the detrimental securities transaction'" (quoting Emergent
Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003))), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 935
(2005).
33. Id.
34. See Devin F. Ryan, Comment, Yet Another Bough on the "Judicial Oak": The Second Circuit Clarifies
Inquiry Notice and Its Loss Causation Requirement under the PSLRA in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 79 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 485, 509 (2005) ("[L]oss causation, the far more subtle stepchild of causation, is arguably
analogous to the tort concept of proximate or legal causation.").
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the date of purchase was inflated because of the [defendant's] misrepresentation.""
Other circuits, including the Eighth and Second Circuits, also have endorsed this
approach. 6 This view of loss causation presumes that plaintiffs suffer a financial
loss at the time of the purchase transaction because they pay more for the security
than it is actually worth. 7 The fact that the loss, at that instant, is purely speculative
and has not been realized in dollars and cents is deemed irrelevant. In so doing, the
minority view implicitly presumes that securities have some inherent "intrinsic
value." 8 Under this view of loss causation, when a seller makes a misrepresentation
that distorts the trading price of a security and changes it from its "intrinsic value,"
the seller defrauds the purchaser in violation of federal securities laws at that
instant.39
The majority view of loss causation is different. It requires plaintiffs to prove that
they have suffered an actual financial loss in a subsequent sale transaction. The
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits all support some mani-
festation of this view.4" The majority approach does not assume that plaintiffs suf-
35. 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added), cert. denied sub noma., Ernst & Young LLP v.
Knapp, 519 U.S. 1112 (1997). This view finds support from several commentators who have opined that the
injurious event in a section 10(b) claim is the purchase transaction itself and that, if there is a subsequent
realization of the truth either all at once via a corrective disclosure or via a slow and steady leaking of informa-
tion, those events are properly understood as evidence of the extent of the injury that was already suffered
rather than the injurious events themselves. See Fox, supra note 23, at 832; Marge S. Thorsen et al., Rediscover-
ing the Economics of Loss Causation, 6 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 93, 99 (2006).
36. See, e.g., Gebhardt v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 832 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that it was a
sufficient allegation that the "[p]laintiffs were harmed when they paid more for the stock than it was worth");
Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that,
"[pilaintiffs may allege transaction and loss causation by averring both that they would not have entered the
transaction but for the misrepresentations and that the defendants' misrepresentations induced a disparity
between the transaction price and the true 'investment quality' of the securities at the time of transaction");
Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 82 F.3d 877, 886 (9th Cir. 1996).
37. See Knapp, 90 F.3d at 1438.
38. Indeed, the "intrinsic value" theory has been a staple in conventional securities analysis since 1934. See
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 29-30 (2003); see also GRAHAM AND DODD'S
SECURITY ANALYSIS (Sidney Cottle et al. eds., 5th ed. 1988) (explaining in great detail how to properly compute
the intrinsic value of an investment based upon various measurable financial indicators and multipliers).
39. Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003).
40. See, e.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that "[w]here the
value of the security does not actually decline as a result of an alleged misrepresentation, it cannot be said that
there is in fact an economic loss attributable to that misrepresentation ... [and that iln the absence of a
correction in the market price, the cost of the alleged misrepresentation is still incorporated into the value of
the security and may be recovered at any time simply by reselling the security at the inflated price"), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1149 (2001); Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997) (observing
that decisions "explicitly require proof of a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the invest-
ment's subsequent decline in value"); Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 684-86 (7th Cit. 1990) (ruling
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the investment declined in value because of the materialization of a
risk that was undisclosed because of the defendant's fraud), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990); Carlton v. Frank-
lin, Nos. 89-2942, 2972, 2974, 1990 WL 116788, at *4-5 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1990) (per curiam) (holding that loss
causation required the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants' fraud, in some reasonably direct way, touched
upon the reason for the investment's decline in value); Campbell v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., Nos. 85-1703,
1714, 1987 WL 44742, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 1987) (finding that the plaintiff's argument failed to make a
distinction between reliance and causation and that the plaintiff never demonstrated that the defendant's fraud
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fer an economic loss when they purchase securities, even if the price paid is
artificially inflated due to a misrepresentation or omission.4 Rather, this view re-
quires that plaintiffs prove that they suffered a loss that can be measured after they
entered into the securities purchase transaction. In other words, they must prove
that the defendant's misrepresentation caused the plaintiffs' purchase price to be
artificially high, and that the plaintiffs lost money in some measurable respect as a
result.42 In so doing, this view at least inferentially rejects the notion that securities
have some inherent "intrinsic value." There is some evidence to suggest that Con-
gress may have intended to codify this view of loss causation when it passed the
PSLRA in 1995."3 The statutory language it used to do so, however, is ambiguous
and does not expressly adopt this approach."
B. Pleading Requirements for a Rule 10b-5 Claim
Prior to Dura, the appropriate pleading standard applicable to each element of a
Rule 10b-5 claim was somewhat of an open question. Generally speaking, federal
civil actions are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which call for
notice pleading." However, in 1995 Congress passed the PSLRA, which, among
other measures, created heightened pleading requirements in federal securities
fraud actions under Rule 10b-5.46 More specifically, sections 21D(b)(1) and (2)
explicitly created heightened pleading requirements for the misrepresentation and
directly caused a decline in the value of the investment); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549
(5th Cir. 1981), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
41. See Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938.
42. See id.
43. See supra note 8. Please note that the pleading standards promulgated by the PSLRA were putatively
modeled after the Second Circuit's standard, which required more than notice pleading for loss causation at the
time the PSLRA was drafted. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 7 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 686 (stating that the purpose of the original PSLRA bill was, "[to clarify] the pleading requirements for
bringing securities fraud claims by adopting a standard modelled [sic] on that currently applied by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the leading circuit court in [the] area" (emphasis added)); see
also, Ryan, supra note 34, at 489 (observing that Second Circuit announced in its Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.
decision that loss causation must be plead to a higher standard than notice pleading, and that the standard to
which it must be pled is similar to the one subsequently proscribed by Congress via the PSLRA for scienter and
misrepresentation). More specifically, the Second Circuit's Lentell decision, which raised the pleading standard
for loss causation, was announced on January 20, 2005. See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 935 (2005).
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000) (stating that "[in any private action arising under this chapter, the
plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this
chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages" (emphasis added)).
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief"); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (stating that "the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim").
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(I). In section 21D(b)(1), the PSLRA states:
Misleading Statements and Omissions.-In any private action arising under this title in which the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant-
(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading;
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scienter elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim.47 Interestingly, the provision in the PSLRA
that addressed loss causation did not expressly call for the application of a height-
ened pleading standard to plaintiffs' loss causation pleadings. 8 Some have argued
that Congress only intended for the misrepresentation and scienter elements to be
subject to a heightened pleading requirement, and intended the loss causation ele-
ment to be pled according to the more traditional notice pleading standard.49
Others have argued that the omission was the result of poor drafting, and that
reading the PSLRA to add the loss causation element and then simultaneously ex-
clude it from the new pleading standard is illogical and counterproductive in light
of the legislation's putative purpose.50
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
A. The Court's Holding Regarding the Substantive Elements of a Rule lOb-5
Claim
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo the Supreme Court reviewed the Ninth
Circuit's holding that a plaintiff could properly plead and prove loss causation,
"simply by alleging in the complaint and subsequently establishing that 'the price'
of the securities 'on the date of purchase was inflated because of the [defendant's]
misrepresentation."' 5t The Court held that this view of loss causation was falla-
cious, stating that the Ninth Circuit's view of what must be pled and proven was
incorrect. 2 However, rather than proffer some affirmative guidance as to what con-
stitutes a showing of loss causation, the Court chose to pursue an addition-by-
subtraction approach in its jurisprudence in this area, merely explaining why the
Ninth Circuit's approach was incorrect. To that end, the Court pointed to three
rationales for its holding.53
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why
the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is
formed.
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
47. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act §§ 21D(b)(1)-(2).
48. See supra note 44.
49. See Patrick J. Coughlin et al., What's Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs' Attorneys Review the
Supreme Court's Opinion and Its Imports for Securities Fraud Litigation, 37 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 1, 9-10 (2005); see
also Christopher J. Dutton, Note, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: Extracting Teeth from Securities Regula-
tion, 33 N. Ky. L. REv. 153, 178 (2006).
50. See Ryan, supra note 34, at 489 (arguing that the Second Circuit correctly held that a fact-specific
inquiry into the causal link between the fraud and the drop in stock price was an indispensable touchstone of
pleading a Rule 10b-5 claim because, in doing so, the court was resetting "the benchmark of its loss causation
pleading standards to the heightened level originally intended by Congress under the PSLRA" (emphasis added));
see also supra note 8.
51. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005) (quoting Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339
F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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The Court first observed that the Ninth Circuit's view of loss causation was illog-
ical. The Court stated that, "as a matter of pure logic, at the moment the transac-
tion takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated purchase payment is
offset by ownership of a share that at that instant possesses equivalent value." 4 The
most that logic alone permits, reasoned the Court, "is that the higher purchase
price will sometimes play a role in bringing about a future loss," though not al-
ways."5 Thus, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's view of loss causation because
it conflated the idea that a detriment would sometimes impact a purchaser with the
notion that it would always do so.
Next, the Court stated that the uniqueness of the Ninth Circuit's view argued
against its validity because of the nature of a private Rule 10b-5 claim. 6 The Court
explained that a lack of support from other circuits was particularly damning to the
Ninth Circuit's approach because a private Rule 10b-5 claim was a judicially im-
plied cause of action, and thus has its roots in the common law. 7 More specifically,
the Court likened Rule 10b-5 claims to common law deceit and misrepresentation
actions, which require proof of actual economic loss in order for a remedy to lie. 8
The Court observed that in order to recover in such actions, "a plaintiff [must]
show not only that had he known the truth he would not have acted but also that
he suffered actual economic loss." 9 Because the Ninth Circuit's approach deviated
from the requirements of similar common law claims, the Court opined that it was
not surprising that other circuits had rejected the Ninth Circuit's "inflated purchase
price" approach.65 Furthermore, reasoned the Court, because a Rule 10b-5 claim
had its roots in the common law, the lack of support from other circuits suggested
that the Ninth Circuit's approach was incorrect.6'
Finally, the Court observed that the Ninth Circuit's "inflated purchase price"
approach frustrated the purpose of the PSLRA and American securities laws gener-
ally.62 The Court stated that the goal of the federal securities laws is to, "maintain
public confidence in the marketplace," rather than to provide investors with insur-
ance against potential financial losses.63 Additionally, the Court observed that the
language of the PSLRA emphasizes the requirement that a plaintiff must have suf-
fered an actual financial loss in order to recover.64 According to the Court, adopting
54. Id. at 342.
55. Id. at 343.
56. Id.
57. Id. Essentially, the Court was arguing that where a cause of action is judicially created and has no
legislative framework or finite restrictions, the majority view probably is better because that is how traditional
common law developed.
58. Id. at 344.
59. Id. at 343-44 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 344.
61. Id. at 345.
62. Id. at 346.
63. Id. at 345.
64. Id.
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the Ninth Circuit's "inflated purchase price" approach would have effectively trans-
formed issuers into insurers of their own securities' future performance and
thereby created a windfall for opportunistic plaintiffs who never suffered "actual"
economic losses.65 Thus, the Court reasoned, the Ninth Circuit's "inflated purchase
price" approach was inconsistent with American securities laws and the PSLRA
because it would have provided strike suit plaintiffs,' who had not suffered any
actual losses, with a windfall recovery, and facilitated their continued abuse of pri-
vate Rule 10b-5 class action litigation.67
For these reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision that
loss causation could be proven via the "inflated purchase price" approach6" and
held that plaintiffs must prove that they have suffered an actual economic loss in
order to prove loss causation on the merits.69
B. The Court's Holding Regarding the Pleading Standard Applicable to the Loss
Causation Element of a Rule 10b-5 Claim
The Dura Court also addressed the loss causation pleading issue, holding that the
plaintiffs' complaint was insufficient as a matter of law because it failed to allege
that the plaintiffs had suffered actual economic losses.7" In so doing, the Court
chose not to articulate any particular standard with respect to the proper pleading
standard for plaintiffs' loss causation pleadings, again opting for an addition-by-
subtraction approach.7' More specifically, the Court stated that it need not reach
the issue of whether a higher pleading standard should be required of future plain-
tiffs' loss causation pleadings within the federal courts because the plaintiffs could
not even meet the bare-bones threshold of traditional notice pleading.72 Thus, the
Court remanded the case."
IV. ANALYSIS
Though Dura is a step in the right direction, it did not sufficiently clarify what is
needed to plead and prove economic loss and loss causation. Part IV of this Note
65. Id.
66. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATION FINANCE 580 n.2 (3d ed. 2003) ("A strike
suit is an action brought by a stockholder (or his or her lawyer) primarily for its nuisance or settlement
value.").
67. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 345.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 346.
70. Id.
71. See id. (stating that in order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss pleadings need only provide, "'a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."' (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2))).
72. The Court stated, "we assume, at least for argument's sake, that neither the Rules nor the securities
statutes impose any special further requirement in respect to the pleading of proximate causation or economic
loss." Id.
73. Id. at 347-48.
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has three sections. The first section discusses what the Court's Dura holding ac-
complishes. The second discusses what issues the Court's holding leaves open, and
argues that these items should have been squarely addressed. The third and final
section argues that the Court should have held that the out-of-pocket rule is the
only appropriate measure of damages in a fraud-on-the-market case. It also argues
that plaintiffs should have to plead loss causation with particularity. To that end, it
proposes that plaintiffs be encouraged to plead that there was a corrective disclo-
sure price drop; but that, if no such facts can be alleged, they may also allege facts
that evince the existence of a legitimate nexus between the defendant's alleged
omission or misrepresentation and the out-of-pocket losses/damages of which the
plaintiffs complain in order to properly plead loss causation.
A. Dura legitimized the loss causation element of a rule 10b-5 claim, and
dismissed the Ninth Circuit's approach to loss causation.
Dura is not a total loss. In Dura, the Supreme Court attempted to dispel the notion
that the same set of facts can serve as proof of both transaction causation and loss
causation. The Court accomplished this by dismissing the Ninth Circuit's concep-
tion of loss causation as illogical. 4 Prior to Dura, several Circuits and commenta-
tors were conceptualizing the inquiry in purely economic terms under the auspice
of erring on the side of the shareholder despite the PSLRA's clear aim at tightening
the pleading requirements for 10b-5 cases.7" In dismissing the Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach, the Court's holding also legitimized the bifurcated approach to pleading
and proving causation in private 10b-5 cases.76 Had the Court sided with the Ninth
Circuit, three of the six elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim could have been presumed
in fraud-on-the-market cases.77 Such a result would almost assuredly have further
exacerbated the strike suit phenomenon Congress intended to prevent and may
have bankrupted the loss causation element of any proximate causation functional-
ity it might have had.78 To the extent that the Court's substantive holding makes it
harder for uninjured shareholders to become certified members of a federal securi-
74. See id. at 342 (stating the Ninth Circuit's view that, "at the end of the day plaintiffs need only 'estab-
lish,' i.e., prove, that 'the price on the date of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation.' . . . is
wrong .... " (quoting Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003))).
75. See supra note 8; see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class
Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 393 (2007) ("Congress passed the PSLRA, in part, to facilitate earlier dismissal of
securities class actions that do not plead a prima facie case.").
76. See Fox, supra note 23, at 842 (observing that the Supreme Court was not the judicial body that
developed the bi-furcated causation analysis, and that the Court's Dura holding was its first acknowledgement
that such an approach was proper in Rule lOb-5 cases).
77. See Mackenzie Shea, Comment, Securities Fraud Litigation-Lost in Causation: Investors Not Entitled to
Presumption of Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases-Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct.
1627 (2005), 11 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADV. 255, 261 (2006) (observing that in fraud-on-the-market cases
reliance and/or transaction causation is presumed, and if the same facts can prove loss causation and transac-
tion causation as the Ninth Circuit's approach allows, loss causation is essentially presumed as well).
78. See id.; see also supra note 8.
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ties fraud plaintiff class-the putative purpose of the PSLRA-it is clearly a victory
for the securities fraud defense bar, public companies, and the investing public.79
Unfortunately, that is about all the credit that can be attributed to Dura. The Court
should have done much more."°
B. The Court missed an opportunity to provide lower courts with affirmative
guidance regarding loss causation and economic loss.
Though judicial restraint is a useful and important tool in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, its utilization in Dura with respect to many of the issues presented was
disappointing. Regardless of what the Court may have intended it to do, Dura set-
tled very little.8 Among other things, the opinion failed to clarify what constitutes a
redressible injury in fraud-on-the-market cases. It did not identify which factual
predicates constitute a showing of actual economic loss, or clarify the extent to
which plaintiffs must plead loss causation. 2 This is particularly disappointing be-
cause it is unlikely that a better opportunity to clarify these issues will materialize
due to the unique orientation of the interested parties in fraud-on-the-market 10b-
5 cases.8 3 The Court was no doubt aware of these circumstances; they were conspic-
uously noted in the legislative history of the PSLRA. s4 As such, the Court should
have offered more affirmative guidance with respect to these issues, but it chose not
to do so explicitly.
Few commentators were satisfied with the Court's holding in Dura, which is not
surprising in light of the plethora of issues the Court's opinion left open. 5 The
Dura Court did not explain what it meant by "actual economic loss," a term used
throughout the opinion."8 Nor did the Court even mention the out-of-pocket rule
for calculating damages in its description of "actual economic loss," leaving many
to wonder whether alternative damages theories are available in a fraud-on-the-
79. See Gregory A. Markel et al., Loss Causation after Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, PLI/CoRP., Nov.
2005, at 1291, 1294, (stating that, "it is the author's position that Dura is a helpful decision for those defending
securities fraud lawsuits").
80. See Fox, supra note 23, at 842 (observing that Dura leaves open two important questions: (1) what
constitutes a showing of actual economic loss, and (2) whether a corrective disclosure is required in order to
demonstrate loss causation); see also Burch, supra note 75, at 381 ("Without consensus on how to measure loss,
both attorneys and corporate actors lack a defined starting point for estimating financial costs.").
81. See Olazabal, supra note 7, at 379 ("Dura may be just as important for what it did not accomplish as
for what little it said about loss causation.").
82. See supra note 80; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Loss Causation after Dura: Something for Everyone,
N.Y.L.J., May 20, 2005, at 5 (arguing that Dura further confuses, rather than clarifies, what is required to plead
and prove loss causation).
83. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
84. See infra note 106.
85. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 82; Fox, supra note 23; Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10
LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 137, 153-55 (2006) (arguing that Dura failed to clarify the application of fraud-on-the-
market theory).
86. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
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market cases post-Dura.5 7 After Dura, it is also unclear whether holders of the de-
fendant's securities can join the plaintiff class, i.e. whether there is a sell-to-sue
requirement."s The Court also did not clearly explain whether a corrective disclo-
sure price drop is required in fraud-on-the-market cases in order to plead and
prove loss causation, or if not, what other types of facts would constitute sufficient
proof thereof.8 9 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court offered no af-
87. Indeed, the blanket application of the out-of-pocket damages rule to fraud-on-the-market plaintiffs in
section 10(b) cases had been, until Dura, relatively settled. See Burch, supra note 75, at 359 ("The few opinions
available on open-market damages generally limit plaintiffs' recovery to out-of-pocket losses .... "). But cf.
Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 343-44 (explaining that Rule lob-5 claims are akin to their common law predeces-
sors deceit and misrepresentation actions, and explaining that courts should apply the same flexible damages
principles present in those causes of action to determine whether a Rule lOb-5 claimant has make an appropri-
ate claim for relief). The Court also noted in a parenthetical that, "[tlhe same is true in respect to a claim that a
share's higher price is lower than it otherwise would have been .... See id. at 343. Some commentators have
suggested that this parenthetical reference is evidence that the Court views this situation, where the price goes
up but not as much as the plaintiff thinks it would have but for the defendant's alleged misrepresentation (what
I have termed the, "did-not-appreciate-enough theory"), on the same footing as the traditional price drop
misrepresentation scenario. See Burch, supra note 75, at 351 n.7. Cf. In re Merrill Lynch Inv. Mgmt. Funds Sec.
Litig., 434 F. Supp. 2d 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that holders of the defendant's shelf funds, which appreci-
ated in value, could not demonstrate economic losses based upon a theory that they would have made more
money but for the defendant's misrepresentation). Though the Court seemed to be stating that it was not
opining on the legitimacy of such an injury, it seems clear that the Court's language did not announce a clear
endorsement of the out-of-pocket rule, which would have excluded such a theory. As such, post-Dura there is
confusion about the legitimacy of the did-not-appreciate-enough theory and as a consequence the scope of
applicability of the out-of-pocket rule. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 342. This Note argues that the Dura Court
should have expressly adopted the out-of-pocket rule for fraud-on-the-market cases, which would have created
an explicit sell-to-sue requirement and categorically excluded did-not-appreciate-enough plaintiffs from recov-
ering. See infra Part IV.C.l.
88. See Fox, supra note 23, at 842. Some federal courts post-Dura have held that Dura does not create a
sell-to-sue obligation on the part of potential plaintiff shareholders. See Ong ex rel. Ong v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 459 F. Supp. 2d 729, 743 (N.D. Ill. 2006); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605
(D.N.J. 2005). While at first blush this might seem strange in light of the language the Court uses in Dura to
discuss the proverbial lob-5 plaintiff's injuries, Dura does not explicitly state that plaintiffs must sell in order to
be able to suffer a compensable injury. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 342. More specifically, when the Dura
Court discussed a hypothetical plaintiff's actual economic losses it did so in terms of "sales" and subsequent
sale transactions, but did not expressly hold that this was the exclusive vehicle through which actual economic
losses could be shown. Id. Subsequent courts have taken note of this disparity, and held that shareholders who
hold the defendant's stock, and thus never suffer a loss from an income tax "dollars and cents" perspective still
can join the Rule lOb-5 class. See In re Bridgestone Sec. Litig., 430 F. Supp. 2d 728, 738 (M.D. Tenn. 2006)
(observing that the only case that read Dura to hold that there was a sell-to-sue requirement, In re Royal
Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 509, 557 (D.N.J. 2005), rev'd, 404 F. Supp. 2d 605 (D.N.J.
2005), was subsequently overturned and is no longer good law).
89. See Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., No. CO1-00988 MJJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94470, at
*35 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2006) ("At most, what can be inferred ... is that identifying a 'corrective disclosure' is
one way in which a 10(b) plaintiff can demonstrate loss causation. Dura does not, however, state that this is the
only way.... ."); see also Fox, supra note 23, at 842; Olazabal, supra note 7, 379-80 ("[Wlhile it recognized the
possibility of a corrective disclosure, the [Dura] opinion cannot properly be read to require such a prerequisite
to recovery in fraud-on-the-market suits."); Thorsen et al., supra note 35, at 118 ("The argument that loss
causation must be demonstrated in every case by a 'corrective disclosure' of 'the Truth' couples the [Dura]
Court's illustration of why purchase time inflation does not necessarily always cause loss ... with the [Clourt's
comment about the 'truth' coming out and facts becoming known."). But 4 In re Veeco Instruments, Inc., Sec.
Litig., 235 F.R.D. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that Dura requires the plaintiff to allege that there was a
corrective disclosure that can be contemporaneously linked to a drop in the defendant's stock price, and that
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firmative guidance as to the proper pleading standard for loss causation.' Each of
these issues was presented in Dura, and ripe for judicial disposition.9 But the
Court chose not to squarely address them.92
These holes in the Court's holding could normally be excused as prudent omis-
sions in the spirit of judicial restraint. This justification is insufficient in this case,
however, because of the unique nature of Rule 10b-5 cases and the limited factual
and procedural histories that typically attach to them on appeal. More specifically,
because so few, if any, Rule 10b-5 cases go to trial, and because the pleadings stage
of the litigation is so important to protecting innocent defendants from strike suits,
as noted in the PSLRA's legislative history, the Supreme Court accomplished very
little by leaving the most important issues in Dura for another day.93
Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, opportunistic, "career" plaintiffs and their
counsel manipulated the federal securities fraud litigation system to extract large
sums of money from various public companies.94 In many instances, these corpo-
there were no intervening causes of that drop in order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in a fraud-on-
the-market Rule lob-5 case); Ribstein, supra note 85, at 161 (observing that if a corrective disclosure is re-
quired, as Dura suggests, then noisy markets would not be a problem).
90. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 346 ("[W~e assume, at least for argument's sake, that neither the Rules
nor the securities statutes impose any special further requirement in respect to the pleading of proximate
causation or economic loss."); see also In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 n.23
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Dura itself does not define a pleading standard for loss causation; rather, it simply rejects the
Ninth Circuit's standard as overly permissive."), affd, Tenney v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., Nos. 05-3430-
CV, 05-4759-CV, 05-4760-CV, 2006 WL 1423785 (2d Cir. May 19, 2006), cert. denied, Liu v. Credit Suisse First
Boston Corp., 127 S. Ct. 733 (2006). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000) (announcing that loss causa-
tion must be pled, but offering no guidance regarding the standard to which it must be pled, stating "in any
private action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission
of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages"
(emphasis added)).
91. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 345-48. Indeed, Dura was a typical fraud-on-the-market, Rule lOb-5
class action suit, and included a corrective disclosure price drop. Id. at 339. On the last day of the class period,
Dura's stock price dropped 47 percent. Id. This was the same day that Dura announced that it did not antici-
pate hitting its year-end revenue targets due to slower then expected sales of Ceclor CD. Id.
92. See generally id.
93. Indeed, when one considers the great amount of trouble that federal trial courts have had in trying to
promulgate a workable standard for these issues, the Court's decision to abstain from opining on them seems
even more disappointing. See infra note 99.
94. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730 (stating that
the purpose of the PSLRA is to "return the securities litigation system to [the] high standard" it once exhibited
before it was overrun by abusive professional plaintiffs' practices); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007) (observing that, "[p]rivate securities fraud actions .... if not ade-
quately contained, can be employed abusively to impose substantial costs on companies and individuals whose
conduct conforms to the law"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)
(observing the same); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that, "the
congressional intent of the PSLRA [was] 'to deter strike suits wherein opportunistic private plaintiffs file secur-
ities fraud claims of dubious merit in order to exact large settlement recoveries'" (quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216
F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000))), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 935 (2005); John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform:
The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAw. 335, 336 (1996)
(observing that the original concern of Congress in passing the PSLRA was the "explosion of meritless securi-
ties lawsuits, particularly class actions, filed solely for their settlement value").
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rate targets were not guilty of any wrongdoing.9" Congress passed the PSLRA in
1995 in an effort to bring these abusive practices to an end.96 Unfortunately, be-
cause of the realities of securities fraud litigation practice, the reforms set out by
the Act did not create much change. 97
Several circumstances, somewhat unique to federal securities fraud litigation
practice, operate together to make the pre-trial stage of the litigation the most
important in the dispute. Specifically, fraud-on-the-market securities fraud cases
are almost uniformly pursued as class actions.9" Additionally, the cases rarely go to
trial because corporate defendants, guilty or not, cannot afford to take the risk that
they might lose the case and face a large damage award.9 9 Such a potential financial
shortfall is especially damning for public companies because the financial markets
demand earnings growth every quarter." ° Indeed, even when awards are later set
aside or overturned, the corporate defendant's share price often has already been
depleted such that it cannot be fully recouped.' In light of this reality, it is not
surprising that few corporate managers, who have a fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder value and preserve their employer's share price, are willing to roll the
dice and hope that their corporations are exonerated at trial. 2 Plaintiffs counsel
are all too aware of this reality. They know that if they can survive a pre-trial
dismissal, the public company defendant will almost assuredly, as a business deci-
sion, settle for a significant sum regardless of the strength of the plaintiffs' underly-
95. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Rebalancing Litigation Risk and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAw. 1009,
1010 (1996).
96. See supra note 94.
97. See infra note 108.
98. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 95, at 1015; see also John C. Coffee Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why
the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 Bus. LAw 533, 534 (2005).
99. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N. Am. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994)
(observing that plaintiffs in such cases have found that defendants can often be compelled, "as a business
judgment, to abandon substantial defenses and to pay settlements in order to avoid the expense and risk of
going to trial"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40 (1975) ("[Elven a complaint
which by objective standards may have very little chance of success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff
out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial ... ."); see also Burch, supra note 75, at 382-83 ("[Mlost
private securities class actions end in confidential settlement[s] .... most cases never reach a jury.
Thorsen et al., supra note 35, at 113 (observing that few if any cases ever make it to trial).
100. See Justin Fox & Rajiv Rao, Learn to Play the Earnings Game (and Wall Street Will Love You), FORTUNE,
Mar. 31, 1997, at 76-80 ("[T]he price of missing a quarter has risen sharply . . . 'missing by a penny' now-
implies the height of corporate boneheadedness-that is, if you couldn't find that extra penny to keep Wall
Street happy, then your company must really be in trouble, and since missing by a penny is already going to
send your stock plummeting, you're better off missing by a dime or two and saving those earnings for the next
quarter.").
101. See Burch, supra note 75, at 384 ("ITihe mere filing of the suit typically causes a drop in a company's
stock price.").
102. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 7 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 686 ("[Ilf a
defendant cannot win an early dismissal of the case, 'the economics of litigation may dictate a settlement even
if the defendant is relatively confident that it would prevail at trial"' (quoting Securities Litigation Reform:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 36
(1994))).
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ing claims. 3 Accordingly, the rejection of a defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
typically signals the end of the true litigious phase of a suit and the beginning of
serious settlement negotiations between the parties, regardless of the merits of the
plaintiffs' underlying claims. 4
The 104th Congress took steps to strengthen the pleading requirements for Rule
10b-5 cases in an effort to facilitate the dismissal of meritless suits at the earliest
possible stage of the litigation.' s Via the PSLRA, Congress commanded that scien-
ter and misrepresentation be pled with particularity. 10 6 It also stated that lob-5
plaintiffs must show proof of economic loss. 7 Unfortunately, these reforms did
not turn out to be the magic bullet that Congress presumably envisioned.'0 8 Con-
gress' efforts, though a step in the right direction, were not enough to effectuate the
full change then contemplated.0 9 More specifically, the PSLRA did not do enough
103. See id. at 6, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, at 685 ("[U]nder the current system, the initiative for
filing 10b-5 suits comes almost entirely from the lawyers, not from genuine investors.").
104. See supra note 102.
105. See supra notes 8, 94.
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
107. Id. § 78u-4(b)(4) (stating that "in any private action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall have
the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss
for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages").
108. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's Experience,
SEc. REG. INST. (29TH ANN.), Nov. 1997, at 955, 958 (observing that prior to the passage of the PSLRA the rate
of federal securities fraud class action suits was approximately 176 defendant issuers per year, while after the
Act was passed that rate had changed to approximately 143-163 defendant issuers per year, and concluding
that the PSLRA did not materially impact the number if securities fraud class action lawsuits filed). Indeed,
Congress itself admitted that the PSLRA fell short of accomplishing its goals when it discussed the passage of
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). See 144 CONG. REC. S4778 (daily ed. May 13,
1998) ("The Congress finds that-(1) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 sought to prevent
abuses in private securities fraud lawsuits; (2) since enactment of that legislation, considerable evidence has
been presented to Congress that a number of securities class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State
courts; (3) this shift has prevented that Act from fully achieving its objectives. . . ."); see also 144 CoNo. REC.
S4781 (statement of Sen. D'Amato) ("So here the President of the United States and the SEC and his Commis-
sioner are saying you are ... closing a loophole that has been used by those who rush to the courts to bring
suits because they are looking to enrich themselves, not to protect the little guy or the small investors.").
Moreover, during the passage of the PSLRA, senators Gramm, Mack, Faircloth, Bennett, and Frist wanted to
make the pleading standards proscribed by the Act stricter and more explicit, but were unable to carry a vote
for reconsideration to that end. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 711 ("[W] hile the bill provides significant incremental relief from abusive securities lawsuits,
the costs of these lawsuits are so high that stronger reform is needed.").
109. See supra note 94. Post-Dura, the Court has taken note of the importance of explicitly explaining what
is necessary to meet special pleading standards that are tied to judicially implied causes of action. Most re-
cently, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Court quoted Dura, observing that its primary objective in apply-
ing various pleading standards in such cases is to weed-out those plaintiffs who have, "'a largely groundless
claim"' and prevent them from "'tak[ing] up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value."' 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1959 (2007) (quoting Dura
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336. 347 (2005)). Interestingly, there are substantial parallels between Bell
Atlantic Labs. and Dura. For one thing, the chances of an in terrorem use of the judicial system in each case was
very high because both were large class action lawsuits. See id. at 1955; Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 336. Moreo-
ver, in both cases, the plaintiffs' underlying claims derived from judicially implied private causes of action,
which were inferred from broader federal statutes aimed at regulating questionable corporate behavior. See
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964; Dura Pharms.; 544 U.S. at 341; see also 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 78j (2007). Despite these
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to tighten the criteria for proceeding beyond the pleadings stage of Rule 10b-5 cases
such that legitimate claims proceeded to trial, but meritless claims did not."'
It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court's Dura decision should be
judged. When viewed in this light, it is clear that Dura did not tighten 10b-5 plead-
ing requirements enough to effectuate the intentions of the 104th Congress. It
failed to place the bite of its holding at the fulcrum of most 10b-5 disputes. This
failing is particularly disappointing because Dura was a prototypical 10b-5 case.
Indeed, it is very unlikely that the Court will have an opportunity to review a more
developed case than the one presented in Dura because of the aforementioned ori-
entation of the parties in the suit."' Moreover, in offering no guidance with respect
to what factual predicates constitute a showing of actual economic losses, the Court
essentially exchanged an old non-descript loss causation standard for a new one." 2
C. The Court should have provided more guidance with respect to what must be
pled and proven in fraud-on-the-market Rule 10b-5 cases.
The Dura Court should have provided lower courts with more affirmative guidance
regarding economic loss and loss causation. Specifically, the Court should have
held that the out-of-pocket rule is the exclusive vehicle through which plaintiffs can
establish actual economic losses in fraud-on-the-market cases. Additionally, the
Court should have held that plaintiffs must plead loss causation with particularity.
To that end, the Court should have held that pleading the existence of a corrective
disclosure price drop is the preferred vehicle for demonstrating loss causation, but
if plaintiffs cannot so plead, they have the option to plead other facts that evince
the existence of a legitimate nexus between the alleged out-of-pocket losses and the
defendant's alleged bad action(s). Such a holding would have been consistent with
past precedent and the express language and legislative history of the PSLRA.
Moreover, it would have empowered defendants to rebalance the 10b-5 litigation
playing field by making it harder for strike suit plaintiffs and their counsel to pro-
ceed with frivolous claims beyond the pleadings stage of the litigation, while still
allowing room for legitimate claims. The remainder of this Note will address each
of these two proposals in turn.
similarities, the Court did not do in Dura what it did in Bell Atlantic Labs. Indeed, in Dura, unlike in Bell
Atlantic Labs., the Court did not squarely address the pleadings issue that was presented, which was arguably
the most important issue presented in the case.
110. See supra note 108.
111. More specifically, in almost all Rule 10b-5 cases, either the defendant's 12(b)(6) motion is granted and
the case is dismissed or it is not and the defendant settles. The Supreme Court must have been aware of this
reality because the stated purpose of the PSLRA is to utilize the pleadings stage of 10b-5 litigation to weed out
strike suits. See supra notes 8, 103.
112. See Fox, supra note 23, at 831 ("The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari.., came against the backdrop
of years of highly confusing lower court decisions concerning what a plaintiff needs to show to establish causa-
tion in a fraud-on-the-market suit.").
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1. In its discussion of the substantive issue of loss causation, the Dura Court
should have held that the out-of-pocket rule is the only appropriate measure
for damages in fraud-on-the-market cases.
The Dura Court should have held that the out-of-pocket rule"' is the exclusive
vehicle through which plaintiffs can establish damages and/or actual economic
losses. Though Dura was not a case about damages, the analysis of a plaintiffs'
proof of a sufficient nexus between the defendant's alleged wrongdoing and their
alleged damages/losses, i.e. loss causation, necessarily depends upon how one con-
ceptualizes damages/losses."4 To that end, and as a matter of first principles, the
universe of potential damages theories available in a Rule 10b-5 case should be no
broader than those available in its common law predecessors, the actions of deceit
and misrepresentation." 5 Generally speaking, the remedies available in those ac-
tions were rescission, benefit-of-the-bargain rule, out-of-pocket rule, and disgorge-
ment."6 From this somewhat broad universe of possible damages theories, it is
prudent to eliminate those that are nonsensical in light of the orientation of the
parties in an open-market Rule 10b-5 case. As such, the benefit-of-the-bargain rule,
disgorgement, and rescission should be removed from consideration because these
three theories are based, at least implicitly, on the existence of privity between the
parties, which is not the case in an open-market Rule 10b-5 case. This leaves only
the out-of-pocket rule.
The Court should have explicitly held that the out-of-pocket rule is the only
acceptable theory for assessing damages in an open-market Rule 10b-5 claim rather
than merely hinting that this was the case." 7 Such a pronouncement would have
been consistent with precedent"8 and the language of the PSLRA." 9 Moreover, con-
ceptualizing economic loss in this way enables the loss causation element, which is
fundamentally related to economic loss, to have the proximate cause functionality
113. The out-of-pocket rule allows plaintiffs to recover only the amount of damages that they lose out-of-
pocket, i.e.-the amount that they overpaid for a given security or asset. It does not embrace recoveries for an
injury where a plaintiff claims he could have sold an asset for more consideration but for the defendant's bad
action, which is notably much more speculative and difficult to prove. See generally Burch, supra note 75.
114. See Olazabal, supra note 7, at 358 ("Though courts and commentators alike have pointed out what may
be obvious to some-that loss causation and damages are different elements of [a Rule 10b-51 claim-there is
no denying that they are fundamentally interrelated." (citations omitted)); see also Thorsen et al., supra note 35,
at 113 (arguing that it is clear that the loss causation inquiry is shaped by how one defines actual economic
loss).
115. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (observing that Rule 10b-5 daims are the
modern version of the common law claims of deceit and misrepresentation).
116. See Burch, supra note 75, at 361.
117. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 343.
118. The few courts that have fully adjudicated an open-market Rule 10b-5 claim have applied the out-of-
pocket rule of damages. See Burch, supra note 75, at 359 ("The few opinions available on open-market damages
generally limit plaintiffs' recovery to out-of-pocket losses . . ").
119. See id. at 356-57 (observing that the 90-day look-back period damages cap proscribed by the PSLRA is
an out-of-pocket measure of damages). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2000).
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that it is putatively intended to have. 2 ° It limits the scope of the potential plaintiffs'
pool to a narrower group than those with merely but for or hypothetical losses,
while allowing those with legitimate injuries to proceed.
The Dura Court came close to adopting the out-of-pocket rule as the exclusive
theory for damages/losses in open-market 10b-5 cases, but did not do so ex-
pressly.' In so doing, the Court allowed confusion to linger about whether there is
a sell-to-sue requirement, and whether plaintiffs can proceed under the theory that
their investment would have appreciated to a greater extent but for the defendant's
wrongdoing (the "did-nottappreciate-enough theory").'22 The Court should not
have left these important issues unresolved. It should have expressly stated that the
out-of-pocket rule is the exclusive theory through which fraud-on-the-market
plaintiffs can establish actual economic losses. Such a holding would have been
consistent with the aims of the PSLRA, which was to make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to bring strike suits and cut down on the number of plaintiffs in a hypo-
thetical Rule lOb-5 class at the earliest possible stage in the litigation.'23 Under the
proposed holding, plaintiffs with legitimate face-to-face injuries could still utilize
damages theories that make sense in those circumstances, while those who utilize
the fraud-on-the-market theory to obtain presumptions of reliance, reasonable reli-
ance, and transaction causation, would need to show that they had real damages/
losses in order to do so.24 This would arguably have been the most efficient com-
120. See Burch, supra note 75, at 363-70 (arguing that irrespective of what Dura holds, limiting the plain-
tiffs' potential recovery to their out-of-pocket damages in Rule lob-5 actions is the only theory that makes
sense when the traditional deceit and misrepresentation frameworks are strained to accommodate a fraud-on-
the-market presumption); see also David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule lob-5
in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1790-92
(2000) (observing that, even in traditional face-to-face 10(b)(5) actions, courts generally only apply the out-of-
pocket rule or, in rare cases, rescission damages).
121. In Dura, the Court renounced the idea that defendants must act as insurers of a plaintiffs' downside
risk, presumably precluding the application of a recessionary damages theory since rescission in some cases
would return to the plaintiffs losses attributable to investment risk in addition to those losses that could be
linked to the defendants' bad action(s). See Burch, supra note 75, at 366-67 ("Requiring the defendant to bear
the risk of market decline distinguishes rescissory damages [awarded in common law deceit and misrepresenta-
tion actions] from out-of-pocket damages, which seek to isolate the price due to fraud and permit recovery
only for that difference."). In so doing, the Court at least implicitly adopted a policy of applying the out-of-
pocket rule exclusively in open-market actions. However, there is also dicta within Dura that suggests the
contrary. In a parenthetical, the Dura Court suggested that plaintiffs who pursue recovery under a did-not-
appreciate-enough theory may be able to recover. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 343. Such a recovery would
not be possible under the out-of-pocket rule. These contradictory assertions within Dura have caused subse-
quent confusion about whether the out-of-pocket measure of damages should be universally applied in open-
market 10b-5 cases.
122. See supra notes 87, 88.
123. See supra notes 8, 43, 94, 102.
124. This is not an overly burdensome requirement. If almost half of the elements of a Rule 10b-5 case are
going to be presumed under the theory that it would be impractical to require plaintiffs to individually prove
that they relied upon the validity of the market, or that their reliance was reasonable, or to prove transaction
causation (i.e. if most cases are going to be pursued as they have been to date under a fraud-on-the-market
theory), it is not unreasonable to require that the remaining elements be pled and proven in such a way that it
is clear that the plaintiffs have suffered real, tangible losses, i.e. scrutinizing those elements that remain a little
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promise between the two competing interests facing the Court.2 ' Unfortunately,
the Court did not explicitly hold this and left the door open for plaintiffs' counsel
to continue to artificially inflate their classes with holders of the defendant's stock
and other parties with illusory or hypothetical losses to the detriment of issuers
and the investing public.'26
2. The Dura Court should have held that loss causation must be pled with
particularity.
It is unfortunate that the Dura Court chose to analyze the sufficiency of the plain-
tiffs' loss causation pleadings according to a notice pleading standard.'27 Instead,
the Court should have held that the heightened pleading standard described in the
PSLRA applies to the loss causation element of a Rule 10b-5 claim. More specifi-
cally, the Court should have held that loss causation must be pled with particular-
ity: that a corrective disclosure price drop is the preferred vehicle through which to
establish loss causation, but if no such facts exist, a plaintiff also can plead loss
causation by presenting facts that evince the existence of a legitimate nexus be-
tween the plaintiffs' alleged out-of-pocket losses and the defendant's misrepresenta-
tion/omission. Such a holding would have fixed a loophole in the PSLRA in a
fashion consistent with its legislative history. Moreover, it would have struck the
appropriate balance between the competing interests at play in a Rule lOb-5 case,
more harshly because of the fact that the plaintiffs are being given the benefit of the doubt via a presumption in
so many other areas. If this proposition has merit, and I believe that it does, then the loss causation element,
which necessarily subsumes the issue of damages/actual economic loss to a necessary and certain extent, is the
best place for this added scrutiny to manifest because the loss causation element is supposed to have a merits-
based filtering functionality similar to that of proximate cause in traditional tort actions.
125. Those two interests are (1) the right of defendants, who have done no wrong, to have confidence that
they will be able to dispel a frivolous suit in an efficient and relatively inexpensive way, and (2) the right of
legitimate plaintiffs who are injured by corporate wrongdoing to proceed to trial. Obviously, the rights of the
former argue in favor of an absolute tightening of the pleading requirements in a Rule 10b-5 case, while the
rights of the latter argue against such a constriction.
126. This argument also finds support in the proposition that the fraud-on-the-market theory is not uni-
versally true. See Ribstein, supra note 85, at 139 ("[T] he market's potentially irrational response to information
raises doubts about the scope of liability for incomplete disclosure, and specifically about the fraud-on-the-
market (FOM) theory, especially in light of the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Dura.. . ."). I do not at this
time advocate for a revocation of the theory via a renouncement of Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
However, if it is true that the fraud-on-the-market theory is not universally true and sometimes inaccurate
because of biases inherent in the way humans interpret financial data and perceive risk, then plaintiffs and their
counsel are receiving the benefit of a presumption that is invalid in some instances. If that is true, it seems
logical that the rules regarding those elements that are not presumed should be crafted such that they have the
effect of separating legitimate claims from illegitimate ones, if for no other reason than to place a check into the
system to disallow plaintiffs from proceeding in an action where there is no basis in fact for liability.
127. In point of fact, the Court side-stepped the question by pointing out that it need not reach the ques-
tion of whether or not the PSLRA imposed a heightened pleading requirement with respect to loss causation in
a Rule 10b-5 case because it could assume arguendo that the notice pleadings standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) applied. After all, the plaintiffs' complaint could not even satisfy that low standard. See Dura
Pharms. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).
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and equipped defendants with a legitimate weapon to thwart attacks from strike
suit plaintiffs and their counsel.
As described in Part IV.B, the circumstances of most Rule 10b-5 suits make the
pleadings stage of the litigation the real battleground for the litigants. 2 The PSLRA
took conspicuous note of this reality and was intended to, among other things,
adjust the pleading standards in Rule 10b-5 cases so that frivolous claims were
easily dismissed, but legitimate ones proceeded. 9 Post-PSLRA, it has become clear
that the Act has not had the desired effect on strike suit filings, primarily because it
did not do enough to eliminate strike suit plaintiffs at a relevant stage of the litiga-
tion process. " ' The Dura Court was aware of all of these developments. 3' It was
well positioned to address the loss causation pleadings loophole created by the
PSLRA, but it did not.' 3
2
The express language of the PSLRA does not clearly apply a heightened pleading
standard or a notice pleading standard to the loss causation element of a Rule 10b-
5 claim.'33 The Court should have filled this gap in the law.'34 More precisely, the
Court should have examined the loss causation pleadings issue in light of the un-
derlying purpose of the PSLRA, noted that the PSLRA was incomplete and impre-
128. See generally supra Part IV.B.
129. See supra notes 8, 43.
130. See supra note 108.
131. Indeed, the Court has been aware of the strike suit problem since its pronouncement in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), where the Court observed that "even a complaint which by
objective standards may have very little chance of success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of
any proportion to its prospect of success at trial." Id. at 740; see also Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 346 (observing
that one of the purposes of the PSLRA was to restore public confidence in the American securities markets).
132. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Dura itself
does not define a pleading standard for loss causation; rather, it simply rejects the Ninth Circuit's standard as
overly permissive."), affd, Tenney v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., Nos. 05-3430-CV, 05-4759-CV, 05-4760-
CV (2d Cir. May 19, 2006), cert. denied, Liu v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 127 S. Ct. 733 (2006); see also
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000) (announcing that loss causation must be pled but offering no guidance regard-
ing the standard to which it must be pled, stating "[iln any private action arising under this title, the plaintiff
shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this title caused the
loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages" (emphasis added)).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
134. While an argument could be made that Dura is silent as to the proper pleading standard for loss
causation pleadings, the Court's reluctant application of a notice pleading standard has been a stumbling block
for subsequent defendants who sought to defend themselves by moving to dismiss plaintiffs' claims on loss
causation grounds. See In re CMS Energy Sec. Litig., 403 F. Supp. 2d 625, 630 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (holding that
"[t]he Supreme Court's opinion in Dura clearly explains that it does not modify the pleading requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which merely requires a plaintiff to provide 'a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"'); see also Ong. ex rel. Ong. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 459 F. Supp.
2d 729, 742 (N.D. I11. 2006); Brumbaugh v. Wave Sys. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 2d 239, 256 (D. Mass. 2006);
CompuDyne Corp. v. Shane, 453 F. Supp. 2d 807, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Ryan v. Flowserve Corp., 444 F. Supp.
2d 718, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (explaining that, in its view, Dura holds that loss causation pleadings must only
be pled to a notice pleading or 8(a)(2) standard); In re Retek Inc. Sec., No. CIV 02-4209(JRT/SRN), 2005 WL
3059566, at "3 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2005); In re Unumprovident Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F. Supp. 2d 858, 899 (E.D.
Tenn. 2005).
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cisely drafted as evinced by the swift subsequent passage of the SLUSA in 1998, '3
and filled the gap left by the PSLRA in a way that furthered its intended purpose.
The Court could have held that the PSLRA implicitly requires that loss causation be
plead with particularity just like scienter and misrepresentation.'36
Such an action by the Court would have been appropriate in Dura. Indeed, such
an action is precisely the type of gap-filling quasi-legislative roll that the framers
intended the Supreme Court to have." 7 Even the most conservative jurists agree
that the Supreme Court must, at the very least, look at the problem that a piece of
legislation purports to address and construe ambiguous language within that stat-
ute in the way that furthers that purpose most effectively. 3s Indeed, the stage was
set in Dura for a meaningful loss causation pleadings pronouncement to be given,
but the Court chose not to do so."'s
Not only should the Court have held that loss causation must be pled with par-
ticularity, it should have held that the preferred vehicle for so pleading it is via a
corrective disclosure price drop allegation, with the caveat that plaintiffs also can
allege facts that evince the existence of a legitimate nexus between the defendant's
alleged omission/misrepresentation and the plaintiffs' alleged out-of-pocket dam-
ages if no corrective disclosure price drop facts exist. Such a holding would have
135. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
136. See supra note 107.
137. See NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5A:2 (6th ed. 2002) ("It is now a
commonplace that courts, not only of common law jurisdictions but also those which have codified statutory
law as their base, participate in the lawmaking process. The commonplace, for which the Holmeses and the
Cardozos had to blaze a trail in the judicial realm, assumes the rightness of courts in making interstitial law,
filling gaps in the statutory and decisional rules, and at a snail-like pace giving some forward movement to the
developing law."). Indeed, in point of fact, the Supreme Court recently took up this precise role in defining
more clearly what the 104th Congress meant by "strong inference" when it used that term as part of a more
stringent pleading standard for scienter in the PSLRA. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.
Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007). It is unclear why the Court felt comfortable pursuing this end in Tellabs but not in Dura.
What is clear is that the Court has at least inferentially acknowledged via its pursuit of stricter pleading require-
ments in subsequent Rule lob-5 holdings that it did not do enough in Dura to effectuate the congressional
intent underlying the PSLRA.
138. See Jane S. Schecter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation,
108 HARV. L. REv. 593, 594-95 (1997) ("[I]fthe words used by the legislature are open to more than one--as is
often the case in disputes about meaning that reach the courts-the court must look harder and longer and
consider the legislative purpose behind the statute, the legislative history, and perhaps the canons of construc-
tion. Whether 'intent' or 'purpose' or some other similar measure serves as the benchmark, the traditional
approach assumes a discoverable legislative design, and the court's cardinal obligation remains to identify and
execute that design.... [T]he traditional approach to statutory interpretation .... focuses judicial attention on
the dispositive 'legislative intent.' . . . [Tihis conception gives judges clear marching orders. If the words of the
statute unambiguously reflect legislative intent, the court should go no further.").
139. Presumably, this is because the Court did not view the PSLRA's pronouncement that a loss causation
element existed as a loophole or inconsistency. It was at least ambiguous, and possibly inconsistent. As dis-
cussed above, the PSLRA was a document that purported to address the strike suit problem by, among other
mechanisms, adjusting the pleading standards for Rule lob-5 elements. See supra note 8. In announcing that a
new element must be pled, but not mentioning the extent to which it must be so pled, the PSLRA created an
ambiguity. See supra note 107.
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been consistent with the language of the PSLRA. 4 ° Indeed, the damages cap pro-
scribed by the PSLRA which includes a ninety-day look-back period was seemingly
crafted with a corrective disclosure price drop model in mind.'' More importantly,
however, it would have struck the proper balance between the competing interests
in play in Rule 10b-5 litigation.
If the Court had held as I propose in this section, it might have struck an appro-
priate balance between creating pleading standards that facilitate the dismissal of
strike suits and ensuring that legitimate claims proceed to trial. There are two pol-
icy-based arguments for the adoption of my proposed holding. One, it creates a
workable standard that lower courts should be able to understand easily and apply
uniformly. Second, the proposed holding should prove to be sufficiently flexible,
such that it allows lower courts to continue to develop their own jurisprudence
when managing special fact scenarios in the common law tradition, from which the
private Rule 10b-5 claim originated. Additionally, though there is some debate
about whether requiring a corrective disclosure price drop is prudent, it is clear that
it is a very effective way to demonstrate loss causation.'42 Indeed, most commenta-
tors seem to take issue with the proposition that demonstrating loss causation via a
corrective disclosure price drop is the only way to do so, rather than with the idea
that it is the best way. 4 ' Thus, the proposed holding allows room for other factual
scenarios, while encouraging plaintiffs to plead in a universally accepted way, cut-
ting down on confusion without sacrificing flexibility.
Some commentators criticize this position as too lax because it would encourage
corporate wrongdoers to try to escape liability by manipulating how they release
information. These commentators argue that corporations would employ so-called
leak-out or time-release strategies to ensure that no significant price drop could be
140. See supra, notes 8, 43; see also Olazabal, supra note 7, at 360-61 (observing that Congress implicitly
endorsed the use of a corrective disclosure method for establishing loss causation in the legislative history of
the PSLRA) ("[Tlypically, in an action involving a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission, the investor's
damages are presumed to be the difference between the price paid for the security and the price of the security
on the day the corrective information gets disseminated to the market." (citation omitted)).
141. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2000).
142. See Fox, supra note 23, at 855 (arguing that where a shareholder sells their shares before a corrective
disclosure, they probably recouped all of their inflationary premium such that they have no injury and should
be excluded from the plaintiffs class); see also supra note 141. But see, Thorsen et al., supra note 35, at 107
("[Tihe absence of a stock price reaction to a revelation of fraud does not mean there was no inflation and does
not mean that there was no dissipation of the inflationary component of [the] price.").
143. See Fox, supra note 23, at 852 (arguing that one could just as easily measure the extent to which the
price increased when the misrepresentation or omission was made if no corrective disclosure ever materializes);
Thorsen et al., supra note 35, at 109-12 (discussing the merits of event studies and how they can be used when
there is no corrective disclosure to demonstrate how a plaintiff's stock price was artificially inflated due to a
defendant's misrepresentation). But see Burch, supra note 75, at 391-92 (discussing the inherent problems with
event studies, e.g., that event studies can illustrate how a given securities price moved relative to the market, but
it cannot show why it did so).
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contemporaneously linked with a corrective disclosure.'44 Such a development, they
argue, is contrary to the deterrence function of a private Rule 10b-5 action and
would lead to degradation of the public's confidence in the reliability of U.S. finan-
cial markets.'45 This argument is misplaced, however, and confuses the purpose of a
private Rule 10b-5 action with that of its parent-a regulatory or SEC instituted
10b-5 action. The reason that a private Rule 10b-5 claim was implied from the
SEC's Rule 10b-5 was to create a vehicle for wronged plaintiffs to obtain redress for
their financial injuries, not to supplement the deterrent effect of the regulatory
action itself.'46 Moreover, even if private Rule 10b-5 claims have some deterrent
effect, that effect is quite small in comparison to the federal regulatory actions and
criminal proceedings aimed solely at that end.'47 Thus, there appear to be more
good reasons to steer plaintiffs toward utilizing a corrective disclosure paradigm in
alleging and proving loss causation than not. As such, the Dura Court should have
adopted a holding similar to the one proposed in this Note and created a paradigm
where a workable standard for demonstrating loss causation is encouraged but not
required. Such a holding would have been consistent with past precedent and the
PSLRA. It also would have enabled the loss causation element to have the filtering,
proximate cause-like effect it was intended to have.
V. CONCLUSION
The Dura Court's decision was generally a disappointment because it did not pro-
vide lower courts with needed guidance and clarity. Dura did some good by further
defining what is meant by loss causation and, at least theoretically reducing the
number of potential plaintiffs within the proverbial strike suit Rule 10b-5 securities
fraud class. Unfortunately, this last development is probably only theoretical be-
cause (1) few securities fraud lawsuits proceed beyond the pre-trial stage, and (2)
Dura at least implicitly suggests that loss causation need be pled only to a notice
pleading standard. These facts operate together to make Dura's substantive holding
distinctly less relevant. The Court was well aware of these realities and could have
held that loss causation must be pled with particularity, similar to other elements
144. See Burch, supra note 75, at 360 (arguing that after Dura, corporations may bundle good news with
bad news in an effort to avoid a corrective disclosure and get away with making fraudulent misrepresentations
about their stock price).
145. See Fox, supra note 23, at 871-72 (discussing the deterrent effect of private suits and arguing that the
rule should not be eased).
146. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-49 (1975) (holding that only de-
frauded purchasers or sellers of securities have standing in a private cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5 and that
the creation of a private cause of action is not intended to shift the SEC's enforcement burdens under the rule
to the public at large).
147. Indeed, the data suggests that the SEC, the NASD, the Department of Justice, and the exchanges are
responsible for the majority of any deterrent effect that can be observed. See Burch, supra note 75, at 395
(observing that from 2000-2002 only 205 securities fraud class action suits were brought, while over 5,000 suits
were brought by various securities regulatory bodies and agencies). See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,c28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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described within PSLRA. Moreover, it could have done so in a way that provided
lower courts with guidance via a workable standard, but still left room to foster
development of the claim consistent with its common law tradition. If it had done
so, the Court would have taken a very meaningful step toward effectuating the
congressional intent that underlies the PSLRA and American securities laws gener-
ally. Unfortunately, the Court did not think such affirmative guidance was neces-
sary and instead opted to leave many of the issues presented in Dura for
adjudication on another day.
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